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ABSTRACT
This thesis investigates the potential of utilizing banks and
bank branches as a means of delivering real estate brokerage
services. The thesis will answer the question: Is it
advantageous for a new or existing real estate brokerage firm
to offer its services through commercial banks, and if so,
what methodology or strategy should be used to maximize both
market share and profits?
Since banks currently face severe limitations on their ability
to own and operate real estate brokerage firms, this study
focuses on the feasibility of outside, non-affiliated, real
estate brokerage entities contracting with banks to provide
real estate brokerage services to the customers of the banks.
The thesis is primarily concerned with residential real estate
brokerage services, although it is conceivable that commercial
real estate brokerage services could also be provided through
banks.
After a thorough examination of the real estate brokerage
industry both past and present, prior research in the field of
real estate brokerage is analyzed, and the legal implications
of banks offering real estate brokerage services is explored.
Drawing on prior research in the field, this thesis examines
the market for real estate brokerage services in banks, and
analyzes the results of a survey to determine the willingness
of senior bank management to embrace the concept of offering
real estate brokerage services. Finally, a theorectical
methodology is proposed for providing real estate brokerage
services in banks to maximize market share and profits.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Marc A. Louargand
Title: Lecturer - Department of Urban Studies and Planning
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INTRODUCTION
When existing homes are sold in. the United States, the sale
is usually handled by a state-licensed real estate broker or a
licensed salesperson working for a broker. As agent of the
seller, the broker or salesperson typically receives a sale's
commission, usually a stated percentage of the selling price
of the home. In 1986, real estate brokers generated an
estimated commission revenue of $30 billion, about three times
that of the securities brokerage industry.
In the United States, the industry comprises approximately
15,000 active real estate brokerage firms. While the nation's
largest brokerage firms have increased their gross revenues
and dollar volume in recent years, the bulk of U.S. real
estate firms continue to be small-scale companies with no more
than ten sales agents, revealed a survey by the National
Association of Realtors (NAR) [26].
In recent years, there has been an increasing trend toward
vertical integration of service delivery among providers of
financial services. The trend toward vertical integration is
most evident in larger real estate brokerage firms, that
expand to provide the wide variety of services that are needed
in real estate. Many brokerage firms now provide mortgage
finance services, title searches, appraisals, insurance, and
settlement services. As large real estate firms expand their
services, competition for brokerage-related services will
likely intensify.
The trend toward vertical integration of financial services
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has not been completely uniform, since banks have been
prevented by law from operating real estate brokerage firms.
Recently, bank regulators and certain members of Congress have
attempted to expand permissible bank activities into such
areas as securities underwriting, real estate development,
real estate investment, and possibly real estate brokerage.
It remains unclear whether banks will be permitted to own
and operate real estate brokerage firms in the near future.
Although banks cannot own and operate real estate brokerage
firms, it is permissible under current law for non-affiliated
real estate brokerage firms to contract with banks (via lease
arrangements) to provide brokerage services to the bank
clientele.
This thesis examines the residential real estate brokerage
industry in the United States and, drawing upon prior research
as well as field study, analyzes the feasibility, advantages,
and disadvantages of a new or existing real estate brokerage
firm offering its services through commercial banks via a
percentage lease or other contractual arrangement.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE MARKET
Background
The primary function of real estate brokerage is to match
buyers and sellers in the housing market. The residential real
estate broker provides information about the steps in the
purchase and sale transaction, negotiates the terms of sale,
and most importantly, provides information about the market
and about houses being offered for sale. Brokers usually have
expertise and information that consumers lack.
Most home sellers use the services of a real estate broker.
The broker with whom they contract is referred to as the
listing broker, and is compensated according to the listing
contract. A typical listing contract might specify that, if
the home is sold within a given period, the broker will
receive 6 percent of the selling price as a commission for
achieving the sale. The listing contract also will specify the
price which the seller hopes to obtain; however, the actual
selling price is frequently lower than the initially proposed
price.
Listing brokers perform a variety of tasks designed to
facilitate the sale of a home. One of the most important of
their tasks is to list the home in the local Multiple Listing
Service CMLS), which is generally owned and operated by an
association of brokers. Most brokers participate in the MLS
system, although participation in most areas is not mandatory.
The MLS is an information sharing and exchange mechanism, the
use of which is reserved for its member brokers. The MLS is a
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means of informing members, who
brokers, of the seller's desire
will describe the property, the
features, outstanding mortgages,
or her willingness to share
cooperating broker who finds a
broker sets the percentage of the
be offered in this arrangement,
the total commission. In addition
most listing brokers advertise
are potentially cooperating
to sell. The listing broker
asking price, any unusual
etc., and will indicate his
the commission with any
suitable buyer. The listing
total commission which will
which may amount to half of
to utilizing the MLS system,
homes for sale in local
newspapers, advertise in specialized homes publications, and
hold homes "open" on weekends to attract prospective buyers.
Home buyers often work with real estate brokers to find
suitable homes to purchase. While brokers typically inform
prospective buyers of their own listings first, they will then
turn to the local MLS to find additional listings which may
meet the buyer's needs. If the buyer makes a selection, an
offer to purchase the home is made through the broker. A
process of negotiation often follows, with counter-offers
relating to price and other contractual terms changing hands
through the intermediation of the broker.
Once the seller and buyer agree to price and terms, the
transaction is put in the form of a contract, and then enters
into a stage referred to as escrow. During the escrow period,
an escrow agent (in some states, the real estate brokerage
firm itself) will hold the contract and a specified deposit
referred to as earnest money to bind the buyer during a period
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while the buyer seeks to obtain financing or funds needed to
close the transaction. The listing and cooperating brokers
will generally monitor the progress of the buyer in procuring
financing. At the close of escrow, if financing has been
obtained and the other requirements in the contract have been
met, title to the property transfers to the buyer, and the
funds, usually including the brokers' commissions, are
distributed by the escrow agent [27]. In some states, an
attorney representing one or both parties serves in lieu of an
escrow agent to close the transaction and disburse funds.
History of Real Estate Brokerage
The date of the first real estate brokerage business is
unknown; however, real estate brokerage firms were operating
in New York before 1800. Through the rapid growth of cities in
the 1840's, real estate brokerage in the larger cities became
a recognized, established business [4].
In 1847, the earliest known formal organization of real
estate brokers, a local real estate board, was formed in New
York for the purpose of exchanging information among brokers.
The first state associations of real estate boards were formed
in the early 1900s [4). The National Association of REALTORS
CNAR), was founded in Chicago, Illinois in 1908 by 120
brokers representing 19 realty boards and one state
association (that of California). Until 1972, when it changed
its name to the current form, the organization was known as
the National Association of Real Estate Boards (NAREB). By
1926 the organization included nearly 25,000 members. However,
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the Depression brought a sharp decline; membership fell to
less than 9,000 by 1935. Membership increased slowly
thereafter, gaining momentum after World War II. The NAR now
has over 700,000 members, 85 percent of whom are primarily
engaged in residential brokerage. The NAR currently describes
itself as "the largest trade and professional association in
the nation" [27].
The NAR is the parent organization for a tripartite trade
organization operating on national, state, and local levels.
Under a three-way agreement among the different levels, the
NAR grants local boards and state associations the use of the
term Realtor in exchange for the boards' and state
associations' agreement to abide by and enforce the NAR Code
of Ethics within their Jurisdictions [27).
Regulation of the Real Estate Brokerage Industry
The real estate brokerage industry is regulated primarily
at the state level, although all real estate brokers must
abide by various federal regulations pertaining to fair
housing practices and settlement procedures. All 50 states and
the District of Columbia require real estate brokers and
salespersons to be licensed. The license statutes form the
framework for state control of the brokerage industry, and
delineate the licensure prerequisites, the prohibited
practices for which licenses may be suspended or revoked, and
the structures and powers of the regulatory agency.
All states have established two separate categories of real
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estate licenses: one for salespersons and one for brokers. In
order to operate a real estate brokerage firm, an individual
must have a broker's license; therefore, applicants for broker
licenses usually are required to have proportionately more
education and experience than those for salesperson licenses.
The prerequisites for licensure vary considerably from state
to state, ranging from no education and no experience
requirements for either class of license in the District of
Columbia, to 240 classroom hours and three years of experience
for broker applicants in Pennsylvania.
States vary in their willingness to accept the credentials
of licensees from other states. Thirty states have no
reciprocity agreements. Most of the remaining states
participate in reciprocity agreements with a small number of
jurisdictions; in many cases waiving only a portion of their
requirements for transferees.
In addition t.o adhering to state regulations, real estate
licensees who are members of NAR, must abide by the NAR Code
of Ethics. Local real estate boards apply and enforce the Code
of Ethics through Board of Grievance Committees, Professional
Standards Committees, and Arbitration Panels.
Estimated Size of the Real Estate Brokerage Market
There are no accurate figures on the size of the real
estate brokerage market either in terms of commission revenue
or transaction volume. Even the NAR maintains only records of
home sales of existing properties and average sale prices, and
does not take into account new home sales or properties sold
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without the services of a real estate broker. The U.S. Census
Bureau has a Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code
number, 6531, which comprises all real estate related
activities (brokerage, management, appraisal, investment,
etc.). Unfortunately, they do not have data available on total
industry revenue, and even if they did, it would be difficult
to extract only the brokerage portion of the revenue.
The only published estimate available on total size of the
real estate brokerage market is provided by the Roulac Real
Estate Consulting Group of Deloitte Haskins & Sells in their
annual publication Roulac's Top Real Estate Brokers: Facts and
Figures on the Nation's Leading Brokerage Firms. The 1987
edition of the Roulac publication, which is based on 1986
data, estimates the total transaction volume handled by real
estate brokers in the United States in 1986 at $500 billion.
They estimate the total revenue generated by real estate
brokers in the United States in 1986 at $30 billion [26). No
estimate was made as to what percentage of the $30 billion in
revenue was generated from residential transactions and what
percentage was generated from commercial transactions.
Using data available from the U.S. Census Bureau and the
NAR, one can make several simplifying assumptions to obtain an
estimate of the size of the residential real estate brokerage
market. First, an estimate must be made of the total aggregate
home sales for new and resale homes. This figure must then be
discounted to allow for the percentage of homes sold for sale
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by owner (i.e., homes sold without the services of a real
estate broker). Then, the discounted aggregate home sales
figure must be multiplied by an assumed commission rate to
obtain the total residential real estate brokerage market
revenue. Based on the calculations in Table 1 on the following
page, the total market revenue for residential real estate
brokerage services in 1987 can be estimated at $24.8 billion.
Major Firms in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry
In addition to providing the only published estimate of
the size of the real estate brokerage market, the Roulac
report provides the only consistent annual overview of major
firms in the real estate brokerage industry. According to the
1987 edition, approximately 15,000 active real estate
brokerage firms exist in the United States. In 1986, the 25
largest nonfranchise firms and the seven largest franchise
networks together handled approximately $252 billion in
transaction volume, or more than half of the industry's
estimated $500 billion in transactional volume (see Tables 2
and 3). While these 32 large firms accounted for more than 50
percent of the industry's volume, the vast majority of real
estate brokerage firms continue to be small-scale companies
with no more than ten sales agents.
Results from a 1,200 firm random survey conducted by the
NAR indicate that 43 percent of real estate companies
nationwide have five sales agents or less, while an additional
23 percent of firms have six to ten agents. Thus only 34
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TABLE 1
Calculation of the Estimated Size of
Residential Real Estate Brokerage
the 1987
Market
1987 New Home
Sales (2)
Average New
Home Price (1)
Aggregate New
Home Sales
$127,000 = $85.2 Billion
1987 Home
Resales (2)
3,526,000
Average Resale
Home Price (2)
x $106,300
Aggregate
Resales
= $374.8 Billion
TOTAL AGGREGATE SALES $460.0 Billion
Total Aggregate
Sales
$460.0 Billion
Adjusted Total
Sales
$414.0 Billion
10% Homes Sold
Owner (3)
- $46.0 Billion
6% Commission
Rate (4)
x .06
By Adjusted Total
Sales
= $414.0 Billion
Estimated Total
Revenue
= $24.8 Billion
Data sources for Table 1:
(1) U.S. Census data for 1987
(2) National Association of REALTORS data for 1987
(3) Estimate from Carney [4] doctoral dissertation pg. 32
(4) Estimate based on industry research
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671,000 x
percent of firms have eleven or more sales agents,
percent of brokerage firms have more than fifty sales
representatives. According to the NAR survey,
firms operate from one office,
89 percent of
7 percent from two offices,
most of the remaining 4 percent from ten or fewer offices; and
less than 0.5 percent operate from more than ten offices [26].
TABLE 2
LARGEST FRANCHISE BROKERAGE FIRMS IN THE U.S. IN 1986
Company Name Gross
Revenues
(millions $)
Residential
1 Century 21, International 2,037.0 -86%
2 RE/MAX International, Inc. 815.9 N/A
3 Electronic Realty Associates 655.0 85%
4 Better Homes and Gardens 424.0 100%
5 Execu-Systems, Inc. 59.2 85%
6 Better Homes Realty 23.5 93%
7 Key Associates, Inc. 19.0 90%
8 Coast-to-Coast Properties 12.2 92%
Source: Roulac's Top Real Estate Brokers - 1987: Facts and
Figures on the Nation's Leading Real Estate Brokerage
Firms
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Rank
and only 4
TABLE 3
LARGEST NONFRANCHISE BROKERAGE FIRMS IN THE U.S. IN 1986
Company Name Gross
Revenues
(millions
Residential
Coldwell Banker Real Estate
Merrill Lynch Realty, Inc.
New America Network, Inc.
Royal LePage Ltd.
Grubb & Ellis Company
The Office Network, Inc.
Cushman & Wakefield, Inc.
Weichert Company, Realtors
Johnstown American Companies
Schlott Realtors
Goldman Sachs & Company
Colliers International
Long and Foster Real Estate
Fred Sands Realtors
Shannon & Luchs, Realtors
O'Conor, Piper, & Flynn
Great Western Real Estate
Rubloff, Inc.
Marcus & Millichap, Inc.
The Keyes Company
Baird & Warner
Cornish & Carey Commercial
Edward S. Gordon Co., Inc.
Mount Vernon Realty
Cross and Brown Company, Inc.
1,155.6
692.0
462.0
350.0
319.8
285.0
198.0
194.0
145.5
131.4
122.5
121.5
112.0
103.8
73.1
70.0
59.1
58.0
55.3
53.3
52.8
50.0
50.0
45.9
45.0
54%
81%
10%
60%
27%
none
N/A
100%
3%
100%
none
none
92%
71%
N/A
86%
95%
10%
none
65%
80%
60%
none
91%
10%
Source: Roulac's Top Real Estate Brokers - 1987: Facts and
Figures on the Nation's Leading Real Estate Brokerage
Firms
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Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
Pricing of Home Brokerage Services
Critics of the real estate brokerage industry have said
that the commission rates for the sale of residential real
estate in most markets are too uniform to be determined by
competitive forces. The evidence available, while not
conclusive, tends to support the hypothesis that the price of
real estate brokerage services is noncompetitively high.
Studies of brokerage fees nationwide also indicate that the
commission rates contracted for and ultimately paid generally
are highly uniform within any geographic region [27].
A survey of consumers conducted for the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) in 1979 indicated that 85 percent of sellers
surveyed alleged they were quoted a commission rate of either
6 percent or 7 percent by the broker whom they used, and
ultimately 78 percent paid either 6 percent or 7 percent (see
Table 4). Sample studies by the U.S. Department of Urban
Development indicate that in 11 of 16 cities surveyed; 80
percent or more of the commission rates actually paid were 6
or 7 percent [273. Carney [4) examined over 7,000 observations
on actual commission rates for 23 maJor U. S. cities and for
all 50 states (73 total market areas) and found that high
proportions of commission rates occurred at a predominant
market area modal rate, usually at 6 percent or 7 percent.
Although brokerage commission rates tend to be the same
within a given market area, several studies show that
commission rates may be lower on: (1) the sales of higher-
priced homes, (2) sales of new relative to existing homes, and
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(3) non-co-op relative to co-op sales (a co-op sale involves
the cooperation of two brokers, one acting as the listing
broker and the other acting as the selling broker). Carney [5)
proved this hypothesis by regressing commission rates on the
selling price of the home and on dummy variables for existing
versus new homes and for co-op versus non-co-op sales. The
results of his regression yielded coefficients which were all
significant at the 1 percent level.
TABLE 4
National Sample of Real Estate Brokerage Commission Rates
Based on 1979 FTC Consumer Survey of Home Sellers
Commission Rate Percentage of Total
CPercentage)
Quoted Actual
Less than 5% 3.4% 6.6%
5% 4.4% 5.6%
5%-6% --- 2.8%
6% 52.7% 49.9%
6%-7% 1.9% 1.9%
7% 31.9% 27.9%
Greater than 7% 5.0% 5.0%
For many years, the total aggregate real estate commissions
generated in the United States have grown at a rate much
higher than the rate of inflation. The unusually high growth
rate of aggregate commission fees was pointed out both by the
FTC in a 1983 study [27) and by Crockett in 1984 [8]. The
total dollar amount of gross commissions increased by an
average of at least 615 percent between 1950 and 1979, a
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growth rate of nearly twice that for all white-collar wages
during the same period, and nearly three times the officially
acknowledged increase in consumer prices (215 percent) [27).
The aggregate market and pricing for residential real
estate brokerage services may be portrayed (as in Figure 1) as
having relatively inelastic demand, because consumers lack
information, and relatively elastic supply, because entry on a
small scale is easy. In addition, the market has a relatively
stable and horizontal supply, with a long-run upward trend in
demand caused by increases in the number of households and
real income, but with unanticipated fluctuations in short-run
demand, because of changes in mortgage market conditions [4).
Paradoxically, the supply curve for real estate brokerage
services shows that the prospect of a skillful broker or
salesperson being able to earn a high income in real estate
brokerage attracts more agents than are, necessary to
accomplish efficiently the function of brokerage. This
inefficiency in real estate brokerage was documented by
Crockett [7), who concluded that the traditional absence of
price competition among brokers probably has led to an
inefficiently large commitment of resources to the brokerage
industry, supported by excessive rates for consumers of
brokerage services.
A relatively recent phenomenon in the real estate brokerage
industry has been the advent of the "alternative" real estate
broker or "discount" broker. These firms' business practices
differ substantially from the norm in either commission rates
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FIGURE 1: AGGREGATE MARKET AND PRICING
OF HOME BROKERAGE
Commission Rate (Price)
Quantity
SERVICES
Demand
Supply
or type, level, or variety of services offered. The 1983 FTC
study [27] revealed that approximately 2 percent of reported
transactions involved the services of firms which could be
characterized as discount brokers.
Discount brokers generally provide limited services at
costs substantially lower than full service brokers. They
typically charge a flat fee for their services. In the past,
the growth of discount brokerages had been blocked by local
real estate boards that denied these firms access to the MLS.
Today however, it is illegal to deny a discount real estate
brokerage firm access to an MLS system, and both the U.S.
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission are
quite willing to assist discount brokerage firms in gaining
full access to the MLS.
The problems evident in the fee structure of real estate
brokerage could be resolved by the introduction of price
competition. Although stock brokerage is much less dependent
upon cooperation among brokers than real estate brokerage, the
success of Charles Schwab & Company, a discount stock
brokerage, has demonstrated that the introduction of the
discount brokerage concept into a previously non-price-
competitive environment can affect changes in that environment
and be successful as well. As competition in real estate
brokerage increases from multioffice, nationally-based firms;
vertically integrated financial institutions; and the
effective use of technology; many brokerage firms may choose
to cut their prices in order to gain a larger market share.
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Emerging Trends In Real Estate Brokerage
The Roulac Real Estate Group in the 1986 and 1987 editions
of their annual survey of top real estate brokerage firms
noted the following emerging trends in the industry: (1) The
trend toward nationally oriented real estate brokerage markets
as major financial institutions promote "one-stop" shopping
centers that include brokerage services; (2) the continued
trend toward vertical integration of service delivery as large
real estate firms, as financial institutions and conglomerates
expand their services; (3) the trend toward increased
competition from financial services companies; (4) the
computerization of information and analysis, as the
technological revolution expands into real estate brokerage;
5) the development of electronic mortgage networks; and (6)
the increasing demand for competitive pricing structures [26].
Analyzing these trends leads to the conclusion that
offering real estate brokerage services in bank branches is a
natural direction for growth in the industry. In an attempt to
provide "one-stop" financial shopping centers, a significant
number of banks have vertically integrated by offering a
variety of financial services. Providing real estate brokerage
would be a logical addition to the financial services already
being provided by many banks. In addition, the development and
growth of electronic mortgage networks will increase
competition among lenders for home mortgage loan origination.
Through referrals, banks offering real estate brokerage would
have a higher probability of capturing home loan business.
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CHAPTER TWO: PRIOR RESEARCH ON REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE
For an industry of the magnitude of real estate brokerage,
a relatively small amount of empirical research and analysis
has been performed. The industry trade organization, the
National Association of Realtors (NAR), maintains data on the
number of Realtor members within a given jurisdiction, the
number of home sales and the average selling prices of homes
in various areas throughout the country, and from time to
time, conducts surveys of its membership to determine such
things as income, expenses, and profits of real estate
brokerage firms. The NAR has done few, if any, studies in
the area of market share maximization strategies, estimating
demand for real estate brokerage services, pricing strategies
for properties, or examining the effects of price competition
on the industry.
The majority of quantitative research performed on real
estate brokerage has been conducted by the academic community;
primarily by faculty members from the finance and economics
disciplines at colleges and universities. One notable
exception is the work done by the Roulac Real Estate
Consulting Group in their annual study of the U.S. real estate
brokerage industry.
The primary periodicals for prior research in the real
estate brokerage field are the American Real Estate and Urban
Economics Association CAREUEA) Journal, and to a lesser
extent, Real Estate Review. Recently, a new publication, the
Journal of Real Estate Research, has begun to publish articles
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dealing with real estate brokerage.
The following is a brief topical summary of prior research
on real estate brokerage:
Market Share and Broker Income
The most detailed recurring survey of the U.S. real estate
brokerage market is the Roulac Real Estate Consulting Group's
annual publication, which is currently in its sixth edition
[26). This publication surveys over 200 of the largest real
estate brokerage firms and lists for each of the firms: gross
revenues, number of offices, number of agents, number of
transactions, services mix, business growth, corporate
management, and a one paragraph company profile. The Roulac
publication is valuable for looking at the nation's largest
real estate brokerage firms; however, it only surveys the 200
largest of an estimated 15,000 firms in the United States,
making it difficult to draw conclusions for the industry as a
whole.
The Roulac study makes the following observations: (1)
Brokerage is still a fragmented business with smaller firms
generating almost half of the total volume, although it is
becoming less fragmented each year. (2) In 1986, real estate
brokerage firms accounted for a total transaction volume of
approximately $500 billion; the 25 largest nonfranchise firms
and the 7 largest franchise networks combined handling
approximately $252 billion or more than 50% of the industry's
total volume. (3) Real estate brokerage is becoming an
increasingly competitive business, and those firms that fail
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to recognize that new tools and a higher degree of
sophistication are required today risk obsolescence. (4) There
is an increasing trend toward vertical integration of service
delivery, as well as an increasing emergence of national real
estate markets as large financial services firms enter the
industry. (5) There is a growing demand for competitive
pricing structures.
More detailed information on industry income and expenses
is available through the NAR publication entitled Real Estate
Brokerage 1985: Income, Expenses, & Profits, which is the
fourth in a series of reports on income, expenses, and profits
of residential real estate brokerage firms. Data for the
report was gathered from 342 brokerage firm owners who
attended a seminar given by the Realtors National Marketing
Institute on "How to Manage a Real Estate Office Profitably:
Managing for Profit and Growth."' The study may be somewhat
biased however, since the course attendees came from- larger,
and presumably better run firms than the typical residential
brokerage operation. A few of the highlights of the 1984-85
study are: (1) The average gross income of all real estate
firms in the survey was $708,959, up 4.6 percent from the
1979-80 survey. (2) Total expenses (after commissions)
averaged $246,881, up slightly from the 1979-80 survey. (3)
Average pre-tax net income of the firms in the survey was
$34,903, up 42.3 percent from the 1979-80 results. Firms of
all sizes were represented in this study, however, the average
number of salespeople in the firms surveyed was 29.6 and the
median was 14.0 [21].
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Several articles have appeared in the AREUEA Journal that
pertain to the real estate brokerage market and broker income.
Frew and Jud [12] concluded that a national franchise
affiliation appears to contribute an extra $929,464 to firm
sales. Jud [16] found that the tendency for buyers of real
estate to seek the assistance of a broker was determined by
the buyers' prior knowledge of the housing market, and that
the demand for home sellers to engage the services of a real
estate agent was principally dependent upon transaction costs
in the housing market, including the opportunity cost of the
sellers' time.
One of the more interesting studies by Colwell and Marshall
[6], analyzed the factors which determine the market share of
listings and the market share of sales for brokerage firms.
Their study examined the effects on market share per
salesperson of obtaining listings and the market share per
salesperson of making sales of six selected brokerage firm
characteristics. The significant factors affecting either
market share per salesperson in listings or market share per
salesperson in sales are: (1) quantity of display advertising,
(2) the number of salespeople in the firm, and (3) whether or
not the firm is a franchise. The number of salespeople was the
most consistently significant variable. The presence of a
franchise and the quantity of display advertising were
occasionally significant. The other three characteristics,
classified advertising, yellow pages advertising, and open
houses, all did not significantly affect market share. The
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study concludes with the idea that studies of brokerage firms
may be mis-directed if one accepts an alternative proposition
that the brokerage firm is relatively unimportant, and that
the important human capital and goodwill belong to the
salesperson. If this alternate proposition is correct, then
empirical work should proceed to determine the impact of
salesperson characteristics on market share.
A recent article in the Journal of Real Estate Research, by
Richins, Black, and Sirmans [24) analyzed marketing strategy
concepts as they apply to real estate brokerage firms. The
authors believe that firms follow one of three strategic
orientations with respect to revenue generation: a balanced
strategy (equal weight to selling and listing), an autonomous
strategy (little dependence on other firms), or a selling
strategy (emphasize selling over listing). The article also
analyzes the effectiveness of marketing mix strategy
variables, such as service level and advertising, in achieving
market share. The analysis indicates a range of effectiveness
in the strategy variables, depending upon the strategic
orientation adopted by the firm. Of over 20 marketing mix
variables analyzed, the most significant are: selling price
of listed property (relative to average value of properties
listed by the firm), geographic dispersion (distance from real
estate office to the listed home), and the selling price of
the property sold. From their research, the authors draw the
following conclusions: (1) Firms should locate their offices
near the areas in which they would like to sell property. (2)
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The more properties a firm has sold in an area, the greater
the probability of making subsequent sales in that area. (3)
It is easier for a brokerage firm to sell less expensive
properties (relative to the average value of properties sold
by the firm) than more expensive properties. (4) Service level
is negatively related to sales. (5) The value of advertising
depends upon a firm's strategic orientation. (6) Franchise
affiliation has a positive effect on market performance.
In addition to studies conducted on the market share of the
firm, a few researchers have analyzed the performance of the
salespeople within the firm. In a 1985 survey of members of
the Illinois Association of Realtors conducted by Follain,
Lutes, and Meier [11], 20 factors thought to determine real
estate salesperson success as measured by income were analyzed
via multivariate regression. Their findings included: (1) A
person who works 50 hours per week can expect to earn more
than 30 percent more than a person who works only 40 hours per
week. (2) Income increases substantially with years of
experience in the early years of a career (over 20 percent per
year for the first five years), but then increases flatten out
for the veteran with more than ten years of experience. (3)
Men and women with similar traits who work the same amount of
time earn the same. Although the findings of Follain, Lutes,
and Meier are interesting, some of their observations may be
partially explained by the fact that salespeople who do not
succeed in the business may leave after a brief period and
those that are successful go on to earn higher incomes.
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Brokerage Commission Rates
Several studies have been completed on real estate
brokerage commission rates which attempt to address the issue
of whether or not price-fixing exists. The Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Report, The Residential Real Estate Brokerage
Industry [27], reached the following conclusions with respect
to brokerage commissions: (1) Many consumers are unaware of
the basic aspects of selecting a real estate broker, including
the fact the the brokerage fee is negotiable. (2) Commission
rates in all markets tend to be roughly uniform from sale to
sale. (3) Brokers that have attracted many listings with
advertising low commission fees might encounter problems in
cooperatively selling their listings.
Since discount brokers may offer cooperating brokers less
compensation than that provided by traditional brokers, it is
alleged that traditional brokers steer their buyers away from
homes listed by discount brokers. Discount brokers charging
less than the prevailing commission rate, therefore, may find
that while competition in price facilitates the acquisition of
listings, it often hampers efforts to sell those listings.
This in turn makes price competition an unsuccessful strategy,
and in the FTC's opinion is the principal explanation for the
uniformity of commission rates in most local markets.
Carney [5] concluded that brokerage commissions are lower
for higher-priced homes, new relative to existing homes, and
non-co-op sales relative to co-op sales. In a separate study
consisting of over 7,000 observations of home brokerage
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commission rates, Carney [4) concluded: (1) Brokerage
commissions tend to be uniform or concentrated at a single
modal rate of 6 percent or 7 percent of the selling price of a
home. (2) The distribution of rates is negatively skewed,
suggesting some discounting from the modal rate. (3)
Commission splits tend to be uniform at a 50-50 ratio.
In a study conducted at the University of Houston, Crockett
[7] discovered that the absence of price competition among
brokers may have led to an inefficiently large commitment of
resources to the brokerage industry, supported by excessive
rates for consumer brokerage services. The results he observed
stem from the way that competitive pressures emerge when price
competition is largely suppressed. Crockett believes that the
key to enhanced price competition probably lies in increasing
accessibility to the market information maintained by the
multiple listing service (MLS), and that one step in that
direction is to insure that discount brokers may participate
in the MLS. He concludes with the suggestion that the natural
outcome of increasing accessibility to market information
might be to open the MLS to non-brokers, since providing
access to information on a fee basis, without tying it to
other services, is consistent with efficiency in transacting.
In another article, Crockett [8] noted that brokerage firms
attempt to attract market share by means of services rather
than price; and as a result the industry is characterized by
an excessively large agent force made possible by an excessive
commission rate. Also, he feels that when commission rates are
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fixed the competition among brokerage firms can be expected to
lead to excessive expansion in number of sales agents.
Finally, Crockett concludes that consumers will eventually
benefit from the ability to choose between full-service,
relatively costly brokerage firms, and other alternatives at
different prices.
Another study relating to brokerage commission rates, by
Zorn and Larsen [30], analyzes the incentive effects of flat-
fee and percentage-based commission systems from the
perspective of the economic theory of agency. The study
concludes that flat-fee and percentage-commission systems do
not lead to an optimal amount of search on the part of the
real estate agent. Also, the flat-fee commission system has
inferior incentive effects when the seller wishes to sell for
the highest bid found in the search process.
In their textbook, Goldberg and Chinloy [14] apply economic
theory to brokerage commission rates. Economic theory suggests
that the lower the commission rates, the higher the number of
listings. The authors believe that when a broker raises the
commission rate, house listings will fall. The extent of the
fall depends upon the revenues and costs of changing the
commission rate.
Consumer Preferences and Attitudes toward Brokers
The largest comprehensive survey of buyer and seller
preferences in selecting a real estate broker was conducted by
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) £27]. The FTC study of
buyers concluded that: (1) The two primary ways that buyers
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become aware of the agents that handle the purchase of their
homes are that the agent was a friend or relative (26.9
percent of buyer respondents), and that the agent/firm was
recommended to them (22.9 percent of buyer respondents). (2)
The single most important reason buyers use real estate agents
to look for a home is to gain access to information on the
widest assortment of homes. (3) The single most important
reason people looking for a home might not inspect homes
listed with discount firms is that they believe the firms are
not reputable or ethical (27.8 percent of buyer respondents).
The FTC study of home sellers concluded that: (1) The most
important reasons that homes are listed with real estate firms
are to sell the home quickly (19.5 percent of seller
respondents) and to free the sellers from the time commitment
and effort of selling the homes themselves (13.8 percent of
seller respondents). 2) The most important reasons for listing
with a particular agent are the experience and reputation of
the agent/firm (18 percent of seller respondents), and that
the agent was a friend/relative (13 percent of seller
respondents). Not surprisingly, due to the lack of price
competition, only 2 percent of seller respondents mentioned
commission fees as a reason for choosing a particular listing
broker. 3) The single most important reason sellers might not
list with a discount broker is the lack of services (21.6
percent of seller respondents). 4) When asked how real estate
commission rates are determined, 34.3 percent of seller
respondents believed that rates were determined by law or by
the Board of Realtors.
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Blair and Rossi [3) polled 620 consumers who had purchased
a home in the past year to ascertain the brokerage services
they consider most important and the type of brokerage firm
they would expect to offer such services. They found that most
consumers believe there is or would be no difference between
services provided by local independent firms and nationally
affiliated firms. Having salespeople who are willing to spend
time with the customer was the most valued service. Many of
the technological factors (i.e, showing video presentations)
were not highly valued by customers. Commission rate was
ranked fifteenth in importance out of twenty-one categories of
services offered by brokers. Finally, when the respondents
were asked whether a seller should choose a nationally
affiliated broker or a local independent broker, 47 percent
believed a local independent broker should be selected
compared with 20 percent who responded that the seller should
select a nationally affiliated broker.
One study directly pertinent to this thesis was performed
by Kehrer [17]. Kehrer's study was based on an analysis of the
Survey of Consumer Finance, a 5,000 person survey commissioned
by the Federal Reserve Board. In his 1985 study, "Consumer
Attitudes toward Buying and Selling Real Estate through Banks
and Thrifts", Kehrer found that a substantial number of
households are interested in buying and selling real estate
through banks and thrifts. He estimates the immediate market
for the services to be almost 8 million households (10 percent
of all households). The potential market is almost one
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household out of every five. Kehrer also noted that the market
for real estate brokerage services in banks and thrifts is not
an upscale market. That is, three-fourths of the households
interested in doing their real estate transactions in banks
and thrifts are in the middle and lower income bracket of
people under 55, which makes up 65 percent of the homes in the
United States.
Property Pricing Strategies and Time on the Market
A recent study by Miller and Sklarz [19] dealt with
property pricing strategies. In their study of large high-rise
centrally-located condominium sales, they attempted to
determine whether or not asking prices are an indicator of
value to buyers. The basis for their study was previous
research done on consumer goods, which had indicated that
pricing strategies may influence perceptions of quality. Their
study concluded that the existence of an optimal pricing
strategy for large-ticket heterogeneous markets, like real
estate, is much easier to assert than to prove statistically.
The study also demonstrated a positive correlation between
longer selling time and property price relative to the value
estimate. Additionally, a nonlinear relationship was found
where asking a larger list price has marginally decreasing
impact on selling price, as one moves further above the value
estimate. Miller and Sklarz believe that if any optimal
pricing strategy can be inferred, it seems to be to ask (or
list) at a price at least equal to or above that of the
typical pricing spread for other similar property.
33
Belkin, Hempel, and McLeavey [2] concluded that time on the
market is an important factor in describing market behavior.
The study shows that brokers do a good job in negotiating list
price. Within submarkets, a large percentage of properties
sell close to list price and within a short time on the
market. Time on the market data regressed against house
features yields low predictability, demonstrating that house
features cannot be used to predict time on market with
accuracy.
Effects of a Multiple Listing Service
Frew [13], in a recent study of MLS systems, concluded that
although size advantages enable larger brokerage firms to sell
a greater portion of their listings, the evidence indicates
that these advantages also create incentives to avoid
commission splits by withholding the listings from the MLS.
Thus, to save resources through improved efficiency, a
significant amount of resources would be consumed in
enforcing compliance with compulsory MLS participation. Frew
concludes that enforcement problems must be carefully
considered when drawing conclusions about the net benefit of
government intervention to mandate compulsory MLS
participation.
The effects of introducing an MLS system were explored by
Wu and Colwell [29) in their study, "Equilibrium of Housing
and Real Estate Brokerage Markets Under Uncertainty." The
introduction of an MLS system was found to have several
important effects. The MLS does cause housing value to
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increase, but its effect on the commission rate is
indeterminate. MLS brokers, on the average, are found to
undertake more search for both buyers and listings than will
non-MLS brokers. The primary reasons relate to the greater
efficiency of search in the MLS context. Although the
methodology of the Wu and Colwell study is not completely
clear, it appears that they may have neglected to consider
possible appreciation in home values when reaching the
conclusion that the introduction of an MLS system causes an
increase in home values.
Effects of State Licensing Regulations
A detailed description of the state real estate licensing
requirements can be found in the 1983 FTC study, The
Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry [27). The FTC study
provides a tabular synopsis of state education requirements,
experience requirements, continuing education requirements,
and other application requirements. The report also contains
information on examination results, residency requirements,
reciprocity agreements, license fees, and state statutes and
regulations.
Johnson & Loucks [15) examined entry barriers within the
real estate brokerage industry to determine the effect of
differing state entry requirements on the supply of
practitioners, on earnings, and on quality of service
provided. Their study concludes: (1) Regression results
provide some support for the hypothesis that increased
regulation will limit the supply of real estate licensees per
1,000 population. (2) No support was found for the premise
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that higher earnings will result from fewer licensees per
1,000 population. (3) Quality of service does increase as a
result of fewer licensees per 1,000 population: a 10 percent
reduction in the number of licensees will yield a 5.7 percent
decrease in complaints per transaction lodged with the real
estate commission. (4) The real estate industry does not
appear to be acting as cartel by enacting self-serving
occupational licensure regulations to restrict supply and
raise industry earnings.
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CHAPTER THREE: BANKS AND REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE
Historical Role of Banks in Real Estate
Historically, national banks, bank holding companies, and
nearly all state-chartered banks have not been permitted to
own and operate real estate brokerage firms. The prohibition
on banks owning and operating real estate brokerage firms
still holds true today, although Congress is currently
considering whether banks should be permitted to engage in
several real estate related activities, including brokerage.
Over the years, banks have begun to take a more active role
in many aspects of the real estate business. Today, most banks
have extensive real estate lending operations that make home
mortgage loans, permanent loans on income producing property,
and construction loans. According to the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development's "Survey of Mortgage Lending
Activity" for January 1988 [28), commercial banks now account
for 46 percent of all long-term mortgage loan originations
(except land) and 80 percent of all construction loans (see
Table 5).
In addition to real estate lending operations, the larger
institutions (i.e., Citibank) have developed their own real
estate investment management departments to provide real
estate investment expertise on a fee basis to institutional
clients. Also, Bank of America, Mellon Bank, and Wells Fargo
Bank currently sponsor real estate investment trusts. However,
banks have been prohibited from making most direct real estate
investments, participating in real estate joint ventures, and
in operating real estate brokerage firms.
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TABLE 5
Breakdown of the Market Share for Long Term-Mortgage Loan
Originations (Except Land) and Construction
Loan Originations
Commercial Savings & Mortgage Other
Banks Loans Companies Sources
Long-Term
1-4 Family 26% 39% 27% 8%
Nonfarm Homes
Loans
Construction
Loans for 1-4 58% 29% 9% 4%
Family Nonfarm
Homes
Long-Term
Multifamily 19% 52% 7% 22%
Residential
Loans
Construction
Loans for Multi-
Family 76% 12% 2% 10%
Residential
Properties
Long-Term
Nonfarm, Non-
Residential 80% 9% 0% 11%
Property Loans
Construction
Loans for
Nonfarm, Non- 89% 4% 5% 2%
Residential
Properties
All Long-Term
Property Loans 46% 28% 16% 10%
(Except Land)
All Construction
Loans 80% 11% 6% 3%
Source: U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development,
"Survey of Mortgage Lending Activity", January 1988.
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Due to restrictions on bank participation in real estate
brokerage activities, the principal interaction between banks
and members of the real estate brokerage community has
consisted of bank mortgage loan officers contacting real
estate brokers and salespeople to solicit their business.
Typically, a mortgage loan officer will visit several real
estate offices each day to distribute rate sheets that quote
current interest rates and terms available through their
institution. Ultimately, the goal of a bank mortgage loan
officer is to develop a long-term relationship with numerous
real estate brokers and salespeople who will consistently
recommend the loan officer to their homebuyers. Mortgage loan
officers are usually compensated by receiving a portion of the
loan origination fee paid by the borrower on loans they
originate - typically 50 basis points (0.5 percent) of the
face value of each loan.
In addition, banks may deal with the real estate brokerage
community when they have taken back a property as a result of
foreclosure. The services of a real estate broker may be of
great value to a bank when a property needs to be sold quickly
or needs maximium exposure through the local MLS system.
Banks also may deal with real estate brokerage firms as
customers. Many state real estate commissions require that
earnest money deposits be held by real estate brokers in
federally insured accounts at banks or savings & loans in the
state where the broker is licensed. Since earnest money
deposits may comprise 5 percent or more of the purchase price
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of a property, the escrow account of a large real estate
brokerage firm could be a major account for a bank.
Real Estate Brokerage/Savings & Loan Affiliations
Although banks cannot own and operate real estate brokerage
firms, it is interesting to note that savings & loan
institutions are permitted to operate real estate companies.
However, the majority of savings & loans that own and operate
real estate brokerage firms do not have real estate agents
located in their branches. Instead, most real estate brokerage
firms affiliated with savings & loans take advantage of that
relationship by distributing literature in their branches and
by mailing literature in customer monthly statements.
An example of the real estate brokerage/savings & loan
affiliation is Empire Savings of America, the Buffalo, New
York-based savings & loan, which owns 99% of the Gallery of
Homes franchisor operation. Empire Savings also operates a
Gallery of Homes franchise in the Buffalo area, although it
does not have real estate salespeople staffed in the savings &
loan branches. Daniel Brown, Senior Executive Vice President
of Empire Savings, believes that actually placing real estate
salespeople in the savings & loan branches would not be of
great value since the purchase and sale of real estate is not
an impulse transaction.
In 1983, Great Western Savings of Beverly Hills,
California, the nation's third largest savings & loan,
purchased Walker & Lee, Inc., a California-based real estate
brokerage firm, and changed the name to Great Western Real
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Estate. Today, Great Western Real Estate, which is
headquartered in Santa Ana, California, has 37 resale offices
and approximately 1,700 agents. Based on 1986 data, Roulac
[26] ranks Great Western Real Estate as the 22nd largest real
estate brokerage firm in the United States, with gross
revenues of $59.1 million. Like the Empire Savings
arrangement, Great Western Real Estate has no physical
presence in the savings & loan branches. According to Robert
Lind, Senior Vice President of Great Western Savings,
management has been reluctant to allow real estate salespeople
in the branches since they may be too "pushy" and offend the
customers. Also, there is some concern over damaging existing
relationships with real estate brokers and salespeople who
currently refer mortgage loans to the savings & loan. Although
they have not had salespeople in the branches, Mr. Lind
mentioned that Great Western Savings has been able to capture
approximately 40 percent of the loan business generated by
Great Western Real Estate sales transactions.
Unlike Empire Savings and Great Western Savings, Twin City
Federal Savings & Loan of Minneapolis, Minnesota, actually has
a real estate brokerage office in five of their 46 branches.
Twin City Federal purchased several Realty World franchises,
and currently operates a real estate firm under the name
"Realty World - TCF." Realty World - TCF has approximately 300
agents and ten offices, including the five offices in the
savings & loan branches. Don Streeter, President of Realty
World - TCF, states that the real estate brokerage operation
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is generating $40 to $50 million annually in mortgage loan
referrals to the savings & loan, and has achieved a 49 percent
capture rate of loan business generated by Realty World - TCF
agents. When asked what value he places on the presence of
real estate offices in the savings & loan branches, Streeter
said that most of the value is in terms of image and exposure.
Based on over 30 years experience in the real estate business,
Streeter's opinion is that the offices in the savings & loan
branches do not generate any significant "walk-in" customers,
and that the real estate agents in the savings & loan branches
do the same amount of prospecting for listings and sales as
agents who are not located in the savings & loan branches.
Asked whether the real estate operation damages the savings &
loan's relationships with local real estate brokers and
salespeople, Streeter commented that although it is a
sensitive situation, Realty World - TCF generates a
significant enough portion of the savings & loan's mortgage
originations that it counteracts the negative effects.
Another real estate firm with a savings & loan affiliation
is Better Homes and Gardens Real Estate Service. The Better
Homes and Gardens Real Estate Service, which is based in Des
Moines, Iowa, currently has one franchisee in the State of
Iowa that is a savings & loans institution, and according to
Craig King, the National Marketing Director of Better Homes
and Gardens Real Estate Service, a franchisee in the New York
area will soon close a lease deal with a local bank to open
real estate offices in 30 bank branches.
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Guarantee Savings of Fresno, California, which was recently
acquired by Glendale Federal Savings & Loan, currently owns
and operates a three office 75 agent real estate brokerage
firm called Guarantee Financial Realty in the Fresno area.
However, the real estate brokerage offices and agents are not
located in the savings & loan branches. A spokesperson at
Guarantee Financial Realty said that a test marketing period
of placing real estate agents in the branches did not prove
successful since it did not generate enough referral business
to make it worthwhile for an agent to be available at all
times during normal business hours.
Undoubtedly, other real estate brokerage operations exist
that are affiliated with savings & loans, and possibly with
some state-chartered banks. This synopsis of real estate
brokerage/savings & loan affiliations is by no means complete,
and is intended only to give a brief overview of the current
state of the industry.
Bank Regulation
There are four primary types of depository intermediaries
in the United States: commercial banks, savings & loan
associations, mutual savings banks, and credit unions. Each of
these major categories can be subdivided in various ways, such
as whether the institution is federally chartered or federally
insured. This paper focuses on the category of state and
federally chartered , federally insured, commercial banks as
an alternative delivery system for real, estate brokerage
services.
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According to the American Bankers Association, as of
October 1987, there were 14,301 commercial banks in the United
States. In general, these commercial banks are subject to a
more complex system of supervision than any other type of
institution. There are four principal categories of regulatory
authority in the banking industry: (1) the 50 State Banking
Departments, (2) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
(3) the Federal Reserve Board, and (4) the Comptroller of the
Currency. State Banking Departments or Commissions supervise
state-chartered banks. The Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation CFDIC) is an independent agency of the federal
government that insures deposits up to $100,000 per depositor.
The FDIC supervises FDIC-insured banks. The Federal Reserve
Board and the 12 Federal Reserve Banks constitute the central
bank of the United States. The Federal Reserve Board's chief
responsibility is monetary policy, although the board also has
broad supervisory and regulatory authority over the activities
of member banks. In addition, the Federal Reserve Board
regulates all bank holding companies. The Comptroller of the
Currency's office is a bureau of the Treasury Department,
designed to safeguard bank operations and the public through
the regulation of national banks [10].
Banks are organized, or chartered, by either the state in
which they plan to do business or by the federal government.
For state-chartered banks, usually the State Banking
Department or Banking Commission receives applications for
bank charters, grants or denies applications, and supervises
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and examines state-chartered banks in that state.
Banks chartered by the federal government are referred to
as national banks. National banks are chartered, supervised,.
and examined by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
National banks, unlike state-chartered banks, are required to
be members of the Federal Reserve System, and therefore must
observe all applicable Federal Reserve regulations and are
subject to supervision and examination by Federal Reserve
authorities. In addition, national banks must have their
deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
As a result, national banks are usually subject to higher
minimum net capital requirements and higher reserve
requirements than most state-chartered banks, and are more
closely supervised and restricted in some aspects than state
chartered banks.
While national banks are required to be members of the
Federal Reserve System, state-chartered banks are not. State-
chartered banks may become members if they desire, provided
that they meet the requirements imposed by the Federal Reserve
System. State-chartered banks that are members of the Federal
Reserve System are subject to the same higher-reserve
requirements and minimum net capital requirements as are
national banks. They must also be members of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and are subject to examination
by the State Banking Department, the Federal Reserve, and the
FDIC.
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Bank Restrictions on Real Estate Brokerage Activities
Under current interpretations of the law, national banks,
bank holding companies, and most state-chartered banks are
prohibited from owning and operating real estate brokerage
firms. Although Congress is working on legislation which would
address and possibly expand permissible bank activities, the
most recent indications are that national banks and bank
holding companies will continue to be prohibited from directly
engaging in real estate brokerage.
While there is no language in federal regulations, and in
state regulations that have been examined by the author of
this paper, that explicitly states that real estate brokerage
is not a permissible activity for banks, the regulators'
interpretation of the law prohibits banks from engaging in
real estate brokerage. For example, the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency's legal staff interprete the
National Bank Act in such a way that national banks are
prohibited from engaging in real estate brokerage. The Federal
Reserve Board's interpretation of Federal Reserve Board
Regulation Y (12 C.F.R., Section 225.25) prohibits bank
holding companies and other banks under their regulatory
jurisdiction from operating real estate brokerage firms. An
example of state regulation, the State of Maryland's
interpretation of the Annotated Code of Maryland, Financial
Institutions, Section 3-206, prohibits state-chartered banks
from owning and operating real estate brokerage firms. In each
of these examples, the applicable regulations set forth a
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"laundry list" of permissible bank activities, none of which
includes real estate brokerage.
Although banks cannot directly own and operate real estate
brokerage firms, federal and several state bank regulators
have issued interpretive letters which would permit non-
affiliated real estate brokerage firms to lease space in bank
branches on a percentage-lease basis and to offer real estate
brokerage services to the bank clients (see opinion letters in
Appendix). Banks' authority to lease space on a percentage
basis to real estate brokerage firms is conditional upon
observance of several legal and prudential safeguards. First,
banks cannot enter into a partnership with the brokerage firm.
Second, banks should assure that the brokerage business is
appropriately identified as a separate business so that the
public will understand that it is not obtaining the brokerage
services from the banks. Third, any bank advertising or
literature that mentions the real estate brokerage firm should
make clear that the firm is independently owned and operated.
Fourth, the relationship between bank and brokerage firm must
be at arms-length, and banks must avoid tying extensions of
credit to the use of the brokerage services. Fifth, bank
management should consider any security problems that may
arise if the public is given access to the brokerage business
during hours when banking services are not available. Sixth,
banks should not lease space to bank employees, officers,
directors, principal shareholders, or their immediate families
for a brokerage operation due to conflicts of interest.
47
The most recent development in Congress with respect to
banks and real estate brokerage involves both the NAR and the
American Bankers Association (ABA). Late in June 1988, the NAR
and ABA sent to Capitol Hill a carefully crafted agreement on
banking legislation that would prohibit national banks and
bank holding companies from directly engaging in real estate
activities. The agreement is expected to be included in draft
legislation offered to the House Banking Committee by its
Chairman, Rep. Fernand J. St Germain, D-R.I., sometime in July
1988. The Banking Committee is expected to begin work on the
bill in the middle of July, and a final measure could be voted
on before the end of the summer, according to NAR analysts.
The NAR-ABA agreement specifies that, if freestanding
national banks and bank holding companies are ever authorized
to engage in real estate activities, those activities must be
conducted through subsidiaries and must be governed by strict
safeguards, or "firewalls," that would keep banking and real
estate activities separate. The NAR-ABA agreement also
stipulates the following: (1) Banks could lend to clients of
the real estate affiliate only under similar terms to those
available to other clients. (2) A bank affiliate would be
prohibited from engaging in "tying" arrangements that require
a customer of either the bank or the real estate affiliate to
obtain any service, product, or property from an affiliated
company. (3) The bank and the real estate affiliate would be
prohibited from any joint advertising; cross marketing
services, using the same or similar name, trademark, or logo;
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sharing a common place of business; or sharing corporate and
financial records. (4) A bank would be prohibited from
exchanging non-public information about its customers with its
real estate affiliate, except in connection with a bank loan
to the affiliate, or when the information involves activities
other than real estate activities. (5) A bank would be
prohibited from using the services of its real estate
affiliate, such as for disposing of the bank's inventory of
foreclosed properties, except when the real estate services
were provided on terms similar to those available to others.
One issue left unresolved in the joint NAR-ABA agreement is
the application of the proposed safeguards to individuals with
a simultaneous interest in a bank and a real estate brokerage
firm. NAR analysts said that Rep. St Germain is interested in
resolving this question, and a compromise probably will be
reached in the final legislation.
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CHAPTER FOUR: BANKS AS AN ALTERNATIVE DELIVERY SYSTEM FOR
REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE SERVICES
Market for Real Estate Brokerage Services in Banks
In 1985 Dr. Kenneth Kehrer, an economist with Kenneth
Kehrer & Associates in Princeton, New Jersey, examined the
immediate and potential markets for offering real estate
brokerage services in banks and thrift institutions [17]. His
research was based on an analysis of the Survey of Consumer
Finance, a large-scale household survey commissioned by the
Federal Reserve Board, the Comptoller of the Currency, and
other federal agencies. The Survey of Consumer Finance
consisted of approximately 5,000 in-person interviews which
were conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University
of Michigan. The survey interview obtained detailed
demographic and income data as well as comprehensive
information on debts, assets, income, use of credit, and
attitudes toward innovative financial services. In the opinion
of Kehrer, at the time of his analysis, the Survey of Consumer
Finance was unquestionably the best available data base to
study consumer interest in real estate brokerage in banks and
thrifts.
Kehrer's study concludes that the size of the market for
real estate brokerage services in banks and thrifts is quite
large. He estimates that 18.5 percent of U.S. households are
interested in buying and selling real estate through a bank or
savings & loan. Based on 1985 data, this constitutes a
potential market of 14.7 million households. Kehrer estimates
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that the immediate market for real estate brokerage services
in banks and thrifts is 10 percent of U.S. households, or 7.8
million households based on 1985 figures.
Analyzing the potential market for real estate brokerage
services in banks and thrifts by demographic characteristics,
Kehrer concludes that the market for real estate brokerage
services in banks and thrifts is not an upscale market. Of the
potential households interested in transacting real estate
business in banks and thrifts, 75 percent are in the middle
and residual market segments (see Table 6 below for U.S.
household segmentation). Nonetheless, half of these households
TABLE 6
U.S. Household Segments
Segment Age of Annual % of Millions
Head of Household Total of
Household Income Households
AFFLUENT Under 55 $70,000+ 5% 2.0
MATURE Over 55 All 16% 12.8
UPSCALE 22 to 55 $20,000- 14% 11.2
$70,000
*
MIDDLE 22 to 55 $20,000- 29% 23.2
$70,000
RESIDUAL ----- All Others ---- 36% 28.8
* Middle market households are similar in age and income
to upscale households; however, in the middle market,
the household head is not managerial or professional.
Source: "Consumer Attitudes toward Buying and Selling Real
Estate through Banks and Thrifts", Kenneth Kehrer &
Associates, 1985.
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TABLE 7
Percent of Each Segment. That Would Buy
Real Estate through Banks & Thrifts
Potential Immediate Rest of
Market Market Potential
Market
Affluent 15% 6% 10%
Mature 11% 5% 6%
Upscale 15% 6% 9%
Middle 20% 13% 8%
Residual 22% 11% 10%
Source: "Consumer Attitudes Toward Buying and Selling Real
Estate Through Banks and Thrifts", Kenneth Kehrer &
Associates, 1985.
own a home, and a substantial number own additional real
estate. Of the affluent and upscale households, 15 percent are
interested in buying and selling real estate through a bank or
thrift, compared with 20 percent to 22 percent of middle and
residual market households (see Table 7 above). Mature
households are the least interested, with only 11 percent of
respondents indicating that they would consider buying and
selling real estate through banks and thrifts (see Figure 2
for a demographic breakdown of the potential market).
When Kehrer estimated the size of the immediate market for
real estate brokerage services.in banks and thrifts, he
discovered that the downscale nature of the market is even
more striking than in the estimated potential market. Between
11 percent and 13 percent of the residual and middle market
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households are likely to take their real estate transactions
into banks and thrifts in the short run, compared to 5 percent
to 6 percent for the more upscale segments (see Figure 3 for a
demographic breakdown of the immediate market).
The rest of the potential market households (excluding the
immediate market households) are more upscale. A similar
proportion (8 percent to 10 percent) of the affluent, upscale,
middle and residual segments expressed interest in real estate
brokerage services in banks (see Figure 4 for a demographic
breakdown of the rest of the potential market).
In addition to looking at the demographic breakdown of the
potential and immediate markets for real estate brokerage
services in banks and thrifts, Kehrer examined consumer
attitudes and opinions. He concludes that households in the
potential market appear more committed than the general
population to using innovative financial services. Also,
households in the potential market are more likely to own
equity in stocks and are more willing to take risks in their
investments than the general population. Households in the
potential market for real estate services in banks and thrifts
are very interested in consolidating their financial business
in one institution. This suggests that banks and thrifts not
offering innovative financial services such as real estate
brokerage may risk the loss of their customer base to other
institutions already entering the business.
Finally, Kehrer pointed out that survey responses similar
in nature to the Survey of Consumer Finance (which he used to
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generate his conclusions) generally overestimate how many
households would use services of this type. However, he
believes that well-designed marketing campaigns and favorable
experiences of others who buy and sell real estate through
banks and thrifts could attract additional households to use
such services.
While Kehrer's study does not differentiate between real
estate brokerage services being provided directly by banks and
savings & loans, or through contractual arrangements with non-
affiliated real estate brokerage firms, for the purposes of
this paper it is assumed that consumer attitudes and
preferences would be the same in both cases.
Bank Market Survey
Ultimately, the success or failure of a real estate
brokerage firm's efforts to develop a network of banks through
which to offer brokerage services is contingent upon the
willingness of bank management to embrace such a conc-ept. In
order to determine the willingness of bank management to
consider offering real estate brokerage services, a survey of
bank officers in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of.
Columbia was conducted by mail and by telephone. The 27 survey
respondents consisted of bank presidents, CEOs, and marketing
vice-presidents. Survey size was limited due to time
constraints and a relatively low response rate (20 percent) to
an initial mailing to bank management. Since banks in
different parts of the country might have a higher or lower
willingness to consider offering real estate brokerage
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services, the survey was also limited by geographic sampling
constraints.
The survey methodology consisted of the following: (1)
providing the respondent with a brief explanation of the
concept of offering real estate brokerage services in banks;
(2) inquiring as to whether or not the respondent 's bank would
be interested in offering real estate brokerage services at
some point in the future; (3) inquiring as to the perceived
advantages, if any, of offering real estate brokerage services
to the clients of the bank; and (4) inquiring as to the
perceived disadvantages, if any, of offering real estate
brokerage services to the clients of the bank.
Although limited survey size precludes meaningful
statistical analysis, it is possible to make several broad
generalizations about the willingness of bank management in
the Washington, D.C. and Baltimore metropolitan areas to
embrace this concept. For example, there is not an
overwhelming or immediate interest in the banking community to
offer real estate brokerage services,. since only 2 out of 27
respondents (7.4 percent) indicated that their institution
might have an interest in offering real estate brokerage. For
the two respondents that indicated that their institution
might have an interest in offering real estate brokerage
services, the following three principal advantages were cited:
(1) the real estate brokerage operation would generate
additional revenue/fee income, (2) it would create an "in-
house" source of mortgage loan originations, (3) real estate
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brokerage would be a useful service to provide to customers.
Of the 25 respondents who indicated no interest in offering
real estate brokerage services, two principal reasons or
disadvantages were cited: (1) offering real estate brokerage
does not conform to the strategic plan for the bank, and (2)
offering real estate brokerage services may damage existing
relationships with real estate brokers (i.e., real estate
brokers who are currently referring mortgage loan business to
the bank).
With several respondents, the subject of pricing of
brokerage services and discount real estate brokerage were
discussed. The general attitude seemed to be against offering
real estate brokerage services at a discount, for fear of
reprisals from the real estate brokerage community. In fact,
one bank president believed that if real estate brokerage
services were offered at a discount, someone would throw a
bomb through his bank's windows.
Overall, the willingness of survey respondents to embrace
the concept of offering real estate brokerage services was
somewhat disappointing. However, banks may be more interested
in offering real estate brokerage services than stock
brokerage services. The "Invest" subsidiary of ISFA
Corporation of Tampa, Florida is the largest provider of stock
brokerage services in bank and savings & loan branches; with
an estimated 75 percent of the market. According to David
Butcher, Public Relations Director, Invest currently offers
stock brokerage services through 270 out of an estimated
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30,000 banks and savings & loans in the United States. Since
the market leader has less than 1 percent market penetration
among banks and savings & loans, it is conceivable that more
banks may be interested in offering real estate brokerage than
stock brokerage.
Advantages and Disadvantages
Clearly, for both the real estate brokerage firm and for
the bank considering a contractual agreement to offer real
estate brokerage services, advantages and disadvantages exist.
For the real estate brokerage firm, the largest advantage
to offering real estate brokerage services in bank branches
would probably be the increased visibility and market
exposure, obtained with a relatively modest capital
expenditure. By displaying posters and providing brochures in
the branches, as well as mailing information in bank
customers' monthly statements, the real estate brokerage firm
would create the appearance of being active and having a
physical presence in many different communities. Having a
presence in many communities is significant since Richins,
Black, and Sirmans [24] have shown that geographic dispersion
(distance from real estate offices to listed homes) is a key
variable in determining market share. For new real estate
brokerage firms, or for smaller real estate brokerage firms
with only a few offices, the market exposure to be gained by
offering real estate brokerage services in bank branches might
lead to significant increases in market share.
Another advantage for real estate brokerage firms offering
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their services in bank branches is the possibility of direct-
referral business. Upon receipt of information about real
estate brokerage services being provided at their bank, the
bank customers may contact the brokerage firm for information
on buying or selling property. However, based on limited
discussions with savings & loans that have offered real estate
brokerage services, it appears that the amount of "walk-in"
referral business generated by such operations is negligible.
Increased market exposure and the possibility of referral
business generated through bank branches create an advantage
for the real estate brokerage firm seeking to recruit new
salespeople to join the firm. Colwell & Marshall [6] have
demonstrated that the market share for listings and sales are
greatest for firms having the largest number of salespeople.
Finally, real estate brokerage firms that offer their
services through bank branches via a percentage lease
arrangement would have the added advantage of transforming
what for most firms is a fixed expense into a variable
expense. That is, in a 1985 survey by the NAR [21], real
estate brokerage firms spent an average of 12.4 percent of
"company dollar" (gross income minus commissions to
salespersons, franchise or referral fees, co-brokerage fees,
and commissions paid to owners) on rent and utilities for
their offices. In most cases, the rent for real estate
brokerage firms is fixed, or is fixed with an added percentage
rent. Real estate brokerage firms able to transform fixed
expenses into variable expenses (i.e., by signing percentage
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leases with banks), have a tremendous competitive advantage
over firms with large fixed expenses. This is particularly
important for real estate brokerage firms, since the real
estate brokerage business is highly cyclical and is closely
tied to market interest rates. During periods of high interest
rates, real estate brokerage firms having good market exposure
and low fixed expenses are in the best position to survive and
gain market share from competitors.
There are several potential disadvantages for the real
estate brokerage firm considering the possibility of offering
real estate brokerage services in bank branches. First, the
inordinate amount of time and work involved in locating a bank
interested in offering real estate brokerage, presenting the
concept to senior officers and the board of directors, and
negotiating the details of the lease agreement, may be too
much for the small real estate brokerage operator to consider.
Using the analogy to stock brokerage being offered by the
Invest network in bank and savings & loan branches, it may
take six months or more to finalize an agreement with a bank
to offer real estate brokerage services.
The downside to the real estate brokerage firm having a
percentage lease arrangement with a bank is that during peak
periods in the real estate cycle, when commission revenues are
highest, the real estate brokerage firm will probably be
paying a rent which is higher than that paid by its
competitors. This risk could be offset to some extent by
negotiating a percentage lease with a rental amount which
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decreases with higher revenues, or by placing an overall cap
on the amount of percentage rent to be paid.
Finally, in some cases the real estate brokerage firm would
not benefit from the lease arrangement with a bank. In those
instances where banks may not be fully committed to offering
real estate brokerage services, the amount of exposure and
referral business to be gained would not be worth the
percentage rent paid to the banks. To guard against this
possibility, the real estate brokerage operator would be wise
to attempt to contractually segregate real estate brokerage
business generated from banks from that generated from other
sources. That is, although such separation of sources might be
difficult, the real estate brokerage firm should pay
percentage rent to banks only on that business generated
through bank affiliations.
In order to close a percentage rent deal with a bank to
offer real estate brokerage services, it is critical for the
real estate broker to understand what motivates banks, and
what advantages and the disadvantages banks will consider in
the decision-making process.
As discussed previously in the "Bank Market Survey" section
of this report, there are three principal advantages for banks
offering real estate brokerage services. First, the bank
would look to the real estate brokerage operation as a source
for additional revenue/fee income. Historically, banks have
made money principally by taking in deposits from customers at
a stated interest rate and loaning the money back out at a
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higher rate to borrowers. Today, banks earn significant
revenues by offering and performing a variety of services for
their customer bases. This trend toward "fee for service"
revenue has led many institutions into offering new and
unusual services to augment their interest income.
The second advantage to a bank offering real estate
brokerage services would be the possibility of gaining a
larger share of the market for originating and servicing
residential mortgage loans. In a real estate sale transaction,
the real estate agent generally exerts significant influence
over the purchaser's selection of a mortgage lender. Of the
savings & loans that have offered real estate brokerage, one
has been able to achieve a "conversion rate" (the percentage
of purchasers that end up getting their mortgage through them)
as high as 49 percent. The revenue to be gained by banks
originating and servicing home mortgage loans can be quite
large. For example, institutions originating home mortgage
loans typically earn at least one point (1 percent of the loan
amount) up front as a loan origination fee. For a bank
originating $50 million annually in home mortgage loans, this
would mean an extra $500,000 in annual revenue from loan
origination fees. According to Rob Rosenblatt, an economist
with the Mortgage Bankers Association, the average annual
servicing fee paid to the servicing agent for one-to-four
family residential mortgage loans is between 40 and 44 basis
points C.40 percent to .44 percent of the outstanding loan
amount). Because mortgage loan servicing fees can create such
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a substantial annuity over time, Rosenblatt stated that some
institutions even originate loans at a loss in order to retain
the servicing rights.
Finally, the third advantage to a bank offering real estate
brokerage services is that it provides a useful service to
bank customers. Offering real estate brokerage may help
strengthen existing customer relationships or help establish
new customer relationships. In addition, from a strategic
standpoint, offering real estate brokerage services takes
another step toward the vertical integration of financial
services delivery - a recently evolving trend among larger
financial institutions.
As noted earlier, there are several potential disadvantages
to banks offering real estate brokerage services. Other than
real estate brokerage not being part of the bank's strategic
plan, the biggest disadvantage perceived by bank management is
the possibility of damaging existing relationships with real
estate brokers. If a bank currently derives a large amount of
revenue from mortgage loan originations through the real
estate brokerage community, then the potential exists for
decreased revenue as a result of offering real estate
brokerage. Any short-term decrease in loan origination
revenue, however, may be more than offset by a longer-term
increase in revenue due to loan referral business from the
real estate brokerage operation. If on the other hand, a bank
does not originate most of its mortgage loans through real
estate brokers, or the amount of their home mortgage loan
originations is currently insignificant, then offering real
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estate brokerage services could result in a direct increase in
revenue from the outset.
Another disadvantage for banks considering offering real
estate brokerage services is the possibility of alienating
existing customers. If the real estate salespeople become too
aggressive, or if a customer has a bad experience using the
brokerage services, they may take their banking business
elsewhere.
Summary of Proposed Delivery System
While it is impossible, without extensive field research
and testing, to definitively determine the optimal methodology
for delivering real estate brokerage services in bank
branches, it is possible to develop a theoretically optimal
delivery system based on the limited research in the field.
This section describes such an optimal approach for maximizing
market share and profits in the delivery of real estate
brokerage services in bank branches, by analyzing the
following issues: (1) contractual and legal considerations,
(2) marketing strategies and pricing of brokerage services,
and (3) hiring and motivating real estate salespeople.
As noted earlier, most banks are currently prohibited from
owning and operating real estate brokerage firms. This
prohibition would preclude banks from purchasing, acquiring,
or holding an equity interest in a real estate brokerage firm.
In addition, in most states real estate brokerage firms are
prohibited from paying "finder's fees" or referral fees to
individuals or companies that refer potential clients, unless
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the entity making the referral holds a valid real estate
license. Therefore, in order to legally offer real estate
brokerage services to their customers and still receive some
form of compensation, banks must execute lease agreements with
non-affiliated real estate brokerage entities to provide such
services (see bank regulator opinion letters in Appendix).
For example, a real estate brokerage firm may execute a
lease to permit the brokerage firm to occupy a 100 square foot
area in each branch office of the bank. The rent payable to
the bank under the lease may be fixed amount, a fixed or
variable percentage of revenue, or some combination thereof.
In terms of an optimal arrangement for the real estate
brokerage firm considering offering brokerage services in
banks, the best lease agreement would be one in which the rent
is calculated on a percentage basis with no fixed obligation,
or a very small fixed obligation, with the additional benefit
of a cap on the maximum rent that would be paid in -a given
time period. This would give the real estate brokerage firm a
competitive advantage during both slow and peak periods in the
real estate market. During slow periods in the real estate
cycle, the brokerage firm would incur no large fixed rent
expenses, and during peak periods in the real estate cycle,
the rent expenses would not become unusually large. However,
one potential obstacle for a bank considering leasing space to
a real estate brokerage firm would be legal provisions in the
bank's branch office lease(s) that may prohibit the bank from
subleasing space or from utilizing their branch office space
67
for certain activities (i.e, real estate brokerage).
In addition to specific lease considerations for real
estate brokerage firms, as discussed earlier, banks must
adhere to other guidelines established by the regulatory
authorities in order to legally offer real estate brokerage
services. First, the bank cannot enter into a partnership with
the real estate brokerage firm. This issue can be overcome by
carefully drafting a percentage lease agreement.
Second, banks must assure that the brokerage business is
appropriately identified as a separate business so that the
customers will understand that they are not obtaining the
brokerage service from the bank. Also, any bank advertising
or literature that mentions the real estate brokerage firm
must make clear that the firm is independently owned and
operated. The use of disclosure language on brochures,
advertising, and signs should address these issues. In
addition, the real estate brokerage operation could be given
the appearance of separation from the bank business through
the use of different colored carpeting on the floor, movable
partitions, or a kiosk-type booth.
The third guideline that must be adhered to is that the
relationship between the banks and the brokerage firm must
remain at arms-length, and banks must avoid tying extensions
of credit to the use of the brokerage services.
Fourth, bank management must consider any security problems
that may arise if the public has access to the brokerage
business during hours when banking services are not available.
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This issue can be avoided by the real estate brokerage firm
utilizing the bank branches only during normal banking hours.
Finally, banks cannot lease space to bank employees,
officers, directors, principal shareholders, or their
immediate families for a real estate brokerage operation, due
to conflicts of interest.
Developing an optimal marketing strategy and optimal
pricing strategy for offering real estate brokerage services
in bank branches are difficult issues to definitively resolve.
In terms of a marketing strategy, prior research by
Richins, Black and Sirmans [24) indicates that real estate
brokerage firms should locate their offices near areas in
which they would like to sell property, and that the more
properties a firm has sold in an area, the greater the
probability of making subsequent sales in that area.
This research suggests that the "shotgun approach" to real
estate brokerage should be avoided. Instead, the real estate
brokerage firm should attempt to be geographically specific
with respect to its principal area of service. The size of the
geographic area should vary in accordance with the number of
offices, the size of the sales staff, and the financial
resources of the firm. This concept is widely acknowledged
and adhered to in the real estate business and is frequently
referred to as "farming" a territory or region. In the context
of offering real estate brokerage services in bank branches,
it may be difficult to get highly specific with respect to
geographic region of service since some banks have multiple
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branch locations which can be widely dispersed. Accordingly, a
new real estate brokerage firm, or a brokerage firm with
limited resources, should attempt to lease space in branches
of banks which are in reasonably close proximity to their
office(s) and which tend to service the same community(ies).
Larger brokerage firms, or those with significant resources to
devote to developing new sales areas, might consider leasing
space in bank branches outside of their normal area of
operation.
From an operations standpoint, it is also beneficial for
the real estate brokerage firm to keep all of the leased bank
branches within close proximity to an existing real estate
office. In order to comply with regulatory restrictions, the
bank leased space would not be available to real estate
salespeople after normal banking hours. Therefore, since it is
essential that real estate salespeople have 24-hour, 7-day-a-
week access to copying equipment, telephones, contract forms,
conference rooms, and the MLS computer system, the real estate
brokerage firm should maintain a fully equipped office
reasonably close to the leased bank space.
In actuality, the leased bank branch space would seldom be
occupied by a real estate salesperson. The historical
experience of savings & loans that have operated real estate
brokerage firms seems to indicate that the walk-in referral
business generated by having a salesperson available at all
times in the branches is insufficient to motivate a commission
only salesperson to consistently staff the branches. Instead,
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the lease relationship with the bank should be used primarily
to increase the market exposure, image, and credibility of the
real estate brokerage firm, as well as to potentially generate
direct referral business.
Research by Richins, Black, and Sirmans [24) demonstrates
that it is easier for a brokerage firm to sell less-expensive
properties (relative to the average value of properties sold
by the firm) than more expensive properties. That is, it is
easier for a real estate brokerage firm to go down-market than
up-market. Kehrer [17] indicates that the market for real
estate brokerage services in banks and savings & loans is not
an upscale market, so the real estate brokerage firm
contemplating offering brokerage in bank branches should
expect that the majority of the referral business generated
directly from the bank lease arrangement would be for the
purchase or sale of lower-priced homes. Consequently, to
capture a larger share of the market for higher-priced homes
in a given region, the real estate brokerage firm should
concentrate its marketing efforts outside of the bank lease
arrangements on selling and listing homes priced above the
median.
Regarding strategic orientation, Richins, Black, and
Sirmans [24) believe that real estate firms follow one of
three strategic orientations with respect to revenue
generation: a balanced strategy (equal weight to selling and
listing), an autonomous strategy (little dependence on other
firms), or a selling strategy (emphasizing selling over
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listing). Their research indicates that firms following a
balanced strategy achieve higher relative measures of market
performance, both in terms of absolute number of sales and
listings, and in number of sales and listings per agent.
Therefore, for the real estate brokerage firm offering its
services in bank branches, the balanced strategy is probably
best. Using the balanced strategy, the brokerage firm would
have a good chance of earning commissions on listings and
sales from bank-affiliated referrals, and by getting listings,
would have an adequate internal inventory of properties to
advertise. In turn, having properties to advertise for sale
attracts additional buyers to the firm, some of whom may have
properties to sell. Of the largest real estate brokerage firms
in the United States, as surveyed by Roulac [26], all but a
few firms seem to pursue a balanced strategy as evidenced by
the balanced breakdown of business composition between listing
and sale, sale only, and listing only.
An autonomous strategy is difficult to successfully
implement, since most major metropolitan areas (like the
Washington, D.C. area) have well-established MLS systems in
which virtually all major residential real estate brokerage
firms participate. Even large independent real estate
brokerage firms in this type of environment have difficulty
surviving without the benefit of the MLS system. Since most
MLS systems require members to input all listings, or nearly
all listings, it is usually not feasible to operate under an
autonomous strategy on a large scale.
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Like the autonomous strategy, a selling strategy is also
difficult to implement successfully on a large scale. In most
cases, in order to attract potential purchasers a real estate
brokerage firm must have listings to advertise. Generic
advertisements that read "homes for sale" or "we sell houses,"
without making reference to a specific property, usually do
not motivate prospective purchasers to call a real estate
brokerage firm (although there is no research to prove this
conclusion). Therefore, unless a brokerage firm has a large,
steady source of potential purchasers, a selling strategy
should be avoided.
For the real estate brokerage firm considering a lease
arrangement with a bank, there are several ways to make bank
customers aware of the availability of real estate brokerage
services. First, brochures or literature describing the real
estate brokerage services can be sent to the bank customers in
their monthly statements. Second, in each branch of the bank
the real estate brokerage firm can display brochures, posters,
countertop placards, and photographs of homes currently for
sale. Third, since many banks now use their automated teller
machines as advertising media, the real estate brokerage firm
can make arrangements with the bank to have a brief message
appear on the automated teller screens.
Closely related to the selection of an appropriate
marketing strategy for real estate brokerage is the selection
of an optimal pricing strategy. Selection of an optimal
pricing strategy is very difficult, if not impossible, due to
73
the fact that the real estate brokerage industry has had
limited experience with price competition. However, in the
context of offering real estate brokerage in bank branches,
offering real estate brokerage services at a discount may be
detrimental to the real estate brokerage firm. Since
cooperation among brokers is critical to the success of a real
estate firm, offering services at a discount can lead to a
lack of cooperation from traditional real estate brokers, as
is shown in a 1983 Federal Trade Commission report [27]. In
addition, the FTC report cites numerous examples of discount
brokers being harrassed by traditional real estate brokers.
Incidents such as death threats, damage to property, and
disparagement are commonly reported among discount brokers.
Consequently, because of historical problems with discount
real estate brokerage, it is unlikely that most banks would
want to become involved in such a controversial business. In
addition, banks that currently originate a significant number
of home mortage loans through real estate brokers would most
certainly see their referral business from outside brokerage
firms drop dramatically if they began to offer discount
brokerage. Therefore, although traditional economic theory
suggests that offering real estate brokerage services at a
discount would be the best way to gain market share, offering
real estate brokerage services at traditional pricing levels
seems to be the best approach for the brokerage firm
considering bank lease arrangements.
The ability to hire and motivate good real estate
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salespeople is probably the most critical factor in
determining the success or failure of a real estate brokerage
firm. In fact, research by Colwell and Marshall [6]
demonstrated that the most consistent factor in determining
the market share per salesperson of listings and sales was the
number of salespeople licensed with the brokerage firm.
Research in the field of real estate brokerage indicates
that the brokerage firm should attempt to hire experienced
salespeople who are capable of working in excess of 50 hours
per week. In addition, it is advantageous to hire salespeople
experienced in listing and selling higher-priced homes, since
they have a higher probability of being able to list and sell
homes in the moderate and lower-price ranges. However, there
might be some resistance from agents that sell upper-bracket
homes to dealing with moderate income buyers and sellers.
Traditionally, real estate brokerage firms have attracted
good salespeople based upon their reputation for service,
their physical location and facilities, the size of the firm,
the amount of market exposure and name recognition of the
firm, the variety of services the firm offers, and the
"payout" or percentage of the total commission that the firm
is willing to pay to the salesperson. The payout to a real
estate salesperson is a very important factor, since real
estate salespeople usually do not receive any base salary and
are compensated solely on the basis of commission income.
Over the past 15 years, the issue of commission payout has
been used successfully to build one of the nation's largest
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real estate brokerage firms, RE/MAX International. Founded in
1973 by two real estate entrepreneurs, Dave and Gail Liniger,
RE/MAX International is based on the concept of offering
experienced, full-time real estate salespeople 100 percent
payout of the commissions they earn. In 1986 RE/MAX had
already become the third largest real estate brokerage firm in
the United States with $815.9 million in gross revenues and
11,923 salespeople [26]. RE/MAX sells franchises to local real
estate brokers who operate real estate brokerage offices in
assigned territories. The local brokers attract top real
estate salespeople by offering 100 percent payout of
commissions to salespeople who agree to pay a fixed monthly
fee to the broker to cover basic office expenses and the
broker's profit. The phenomenal growth of RE/MAX, which has
been in excess of 40 percent per year since its inception,
supports the belief that good salespeople are highly sensitive
to the percentage payout of commission income.
Consequently, new or existing real estate brokerage firms
contemplating offering their services in bank branches should
consider the possibility of attracting top real estate
salespeople with a 100 percent commission payout option.
However, for sales leads and listing leads which originate as
a result of the bank lease arrangement, the real estate
salesperson receiving 100 percent payout would have funds
subtracted from gross commissions (sufficient to pay the
applicable amount of percentage lease payment to the bank).
Real estate brokerage firms should also consider that bank
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lease arrangements themselves may attract good real estate
salespeople to Join the firm. Since research has shown that
the more real estate salespeople a firm has, the higher the
market share per salesperson, it appears that brokerage firms
should attempt to hire as many salespeople as possible.
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The real estate brokerage industry in the United States
comprises approximately 15,000 active real estate brokerage
firms, and generated an estimated commission revenue in 1986
of $30 billion. Of the $30 billion in 1986 commission revenue,
approximately 83% was generated from residential real estate
transactions. Although most of the brokerage firms tend to be
small-scale companies with less than ten salespeople, the
larger real estate brokerage firms have expanded their
operations through vertical integration. Today, many real
estate brokerage firms provide mortgage loan origination
services, title searches, appraisals, insurance, and
settlement services.
While some financial service providers such as savings &
loans have been able to vertically integrate by offering real
estate brokerage services, most banks have been prevented by
law from owning and operating real estate brokerage firms.
However, banks are permitted to offer real estate brokerage
services to their client base through a percentage lease
arrangement with a non-affiliated real estate brokerage firm.
This paper has examined the residential real estate
brokerage industry in the United States and has analyzed the
feasibility, advantages, and disadvantages of a new or
existing real estate brokerage firm offering its services
through commercial banks via a percentage lease or similar
contractual arrangement. The analysis indicates that it is
legally permissible for banks to offer real estate brokerage
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services to their clients via a lease arrangement, provided
that banks adhere to certain guidelines established by the
regulators.
For the real estate brokerage firm considering offering its
services through banks via a lease arrangement, the principal
advantages appear to be increased market visibility, enhanced
image, and increased credibility. Experiences of savings &
loans which have offered real estate brokerage indicate that
the amount of walk-in referral business from a real estate
brokerage operation located in branches is negligible.
Banks can benefit from the lease arrangement by receiving
rental income from the brokerage firm, as well as potentially
increasing their volume of home mortgage loan originations.
However, the principal drawback, as seen from the perspective
of the banks surveyed, is that offering real estate brokerage
services may damage their relationships with real estate
brokerage firms which currently refer mortgage loan business.
In a survey, only 2 of 27 (7.4 percent) bank officials stated
that they may be interested in offering real estate brokerage.
Given an estimate of the potential market for real estate
brokerage services in banks and savings & loans of 18.5
percent of U.S. households (14.7 million households based on
1985 data), it appears that the concept of offering real
estate brokerage services in bank branches is not only
feasible but also potentially profitable. The new or existing
real estate brokerage firm should certainly explore the
concept of offering brokerage services in bank branches as a
means of increasing both market share and profits.
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APPENDIX:
OPINION LETTERS FROM BANK REGULATORS
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Comptroller of the Currency
Administrator of National Banks
Washington, D. C. 20219
November 17, 1987
Larry E. Hinman, President
Developers Capital Corporation
8 Old Baltimore Court
Olney, Maryland 20832
Dear Mr. Hinman:
This is in response to your letter dated July 28, 1987,
proposing that your company, Developers Capital Corporation
("Corporation"), lease space in the branch offices of national
banks to offer the Corporation's residential and commercial
real estate brokerage and consulting services. In some cases,
rent would be paid on the basis of a percentage of the revenue
generated from the Corporation's business in the leased space.
Based on the facts and conditions described below, I have no
objection to your proposal.
Summary of Proposal
The Corporation, as mentioned, would lease space on a
percentage basis from national banks to offer the Corporation's
real estate consulting and brokerage services. The Corporation
proposes that its real estate brokerage services be made
available to the banks as well as the public. Thus, a bank
would have the option of disposing of real estate acquired
through foreclosure and the like by using the Corporation's
brokerage services.
Your proposal is accompanied by representations that the
following conditions would apply. First, none of the lessor
banks or their officers, directors, employees or affiliates
would hold any stock in the Corporation. Second, the described
relationships between the banks and the Corporation would be at
arms-length, and there would be no arrangements tying a bank's
extension of credit to a customer's acceptance of a product or
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service from the Corporation. Third, the real estate brokerage
activities of the Corporation would be appropriately identified
as being separate from the banks' business.
You also indicate that there would be no relationships between
the banks and the Corporation other than those described. I
have therefore assumed that the Corporation would not employ
bank personnel to provide or manage the provision of the
Corporation's products and services.
Finally, you represent that the Corporation's activities would
be conducted in full compliance with applicable state law,
including the regulations promulgated by the various state real
estate commissions.
Discussion
Permissibility of Proposed Bank Activities
It is well established that national banks may lease their
excess office space to others pursuant to 12 U.S.C. S§29 and
24(Seventh). See Wirtz v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 365
F.2d 641, 644 (10th Cir. 1966); Wingert v. First National Bank,
175 F. 739, 741 (4th Cir. 1909), appeal dismissed 223 U.S. 670
(1912); Brown v. Schleier, 118 F. 981, 984 (8th Cir. 1902),
aff'd 194 U.S. 18 (1904). Incidental to a national bank's
power to lease its office space is the authority to establish
appropriate lease terms by bargaining for whatever terms are
usual and customary in the leasing of commercial office space.
Sgg Interpretive Letter 274 from Brian Smith, Chief Counsel
(Dec. 2, 1983), reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep (CCH)
185,438. As a result, the Office found in Interpretive Letter
274 that a national bank may lease excess space in its lobby to
an insurance agent, and receive rent in the form of a
percentage of the insurance agent's volume of sales or gross
income from the rented lobby space. Emm id.
Because national banks merely exercise their leasing authority
rather than engage in the business of a given tenant by leasing
excess space on a percentage basis, Interpretive Letter 274
established that banks' authority to enter into percentage
leases applies regardless of the nature of the tenant's
business. / Accord Letter from Peter Liebesman, Assistant
A/ Since the lessee described by Interpretive Letter 274 was
not a bank employee and did not propose to employ bank
employees to sell the lessee's products and services, the
Interpretive Letter did not address the circumstances under
which a national bank could share its employees with a party
renting lobby space on a percentage basis. Similarly, I need
not address this matter here since you have not proposed that
the Corporation employ bank personnel.
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Director, Legal Advisory Services Division (Nov. 20, 1984)
(LASD Precedent File No. 42 for 12 U.S.C. §24(Seventh)).
Therefore, national banks may lease excess office space to real
estate brokers and consultants, such as the Corporation, on a
percentage basis pursuant to 12 U.S.C. $$24(Seventh) and 29.
Banks' authority to lease on a percentage basis is conditioned
on their observance of the legal and prudential safeguards
enumerated by Interpretive Letter 274, which will be summarized
here. First, banks cannot enter into a partnership with the
tenant.2 / State law generally negates any inference of a
partnership from percentage leasing; however, such an inference
could arise in cases where the lease percentage is unusually
high or the lessor exercises management control over the
lessee. ee Uniform Partnership Act § 7(4)(b); Friedman on
Leases S 6.101 (2d ed. 1983). Banks and their counsel should
accordingly review the lease terms under state law to ensure
that no partnership would be created. In addition,
Interpretive Letter 274 advises lessor banks to include a lease
clause expressly precluding the existence of a partnership, and
for safety and soundness reasons, a lease clause expressly
precluding any bank liability for a tenant's debts and other
liabilities. ee Interpretive Letter 274, supra..
Second, banks should assure that the tenants' business is
appropriately identified as a separate business through the use
of signs, labeling, and the like so that the public will
understand it is not obtaining the tenant's products and
services from the banks. Be id.
Third, any bank advertising or literature that mentions the
tenant should make clear that the tenant's business is
independently owned and operated. fe id.
Fourth, the relationships between banks and a tenant must be at
arms-length, and banks must avoid arrangements tying extensions
of credit to the sale of the tenant's products and services.
Fifth, bank management should consider any security problems
that may arise if the public is given access to the tenants'
business during hours when banking services are not available.
See id.
Sixth, Interpretive Letter 274 advised against leasing retail
banking or lobby space to bank employees, officers, directors,
principal shareholders, or their immediate families for the
operation of their businesses due to the conflict of interest,
self-dealing, and tying questions that leases to insider-owned
businesses could raise. 5g id.
2/ Banks are generally prohibited by 12 U.S.C. §24(Seventh)
from entering general partnerships. ee Merchants National
Bank v, Wehrmann, 202 U.S. 295 (1906).
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Your proposal to lease space from national banks is accompanied
by representations that comport with the second, fourth, and
fifth conditions described above. Therefore, banks must also
adhere to the remaining conditions above to satisfy the legal
and prudential concerns described in Interpretive Letter 274.
Finally, the limitations of Interpretive Letter 274 do not
generally preclude a bank from having access to the services
offered by its tenant to the public. In my opinion, such
non-leasing transactions between a bank and its tenant do not
give cause for objection where the bank is authorized to engage
in the transactions and the transactions are conducted on an
arms-length basis. In this case, the Corporation would make
its real estate brokerage services available to banks as well
as the public, and therefore give banks the option of
purchasing and selling real estate through the Corporation.
Under 12 U.S.C. S29, national banks are expressly authorized to
purchase and convey real estate for the purposes described by
the statute. Thus, banks' use of the Corporation's brokerage
services to purchase and convey real estate for the purposes
authorized by 12 U.S.C. S29 would not give cause for objection
if done on an arms-length basis. You represent in your letter
that all transactions between banks and the Corporation would
be at arms-length. As a result, I assume that any brokerage
transactions would be at arms-length, and in particular, that
banks would not be obligated in any manner to use the
Corporation's brokerage services.
Applicability of Real Estate Moratorium of CEBA 9 201(b)(6)
Section 201(b)(6) of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of
1987 ("CEBA") precludes the Office from issuing a rule,
regulation, or order that would have the effect of increasing
the real estate powers of banks. This letter does not have the
effect of increasing banks' real estate powers since the letter
addresses an existing real estate power: the power of banks to
lease their excess office space pursuant to 12 U.S.C.
SS24(Seventh) and 29. The subject bank power was recognized by
the courts and specifically applied to percentage leases by
Interpretive Letter 274 prior to the moratorium period.
Similarly, this letter's discussion of banks' use of real
estate brokerage services also addresses an existing real
estate power--the express power of banks to purchase and convey
real estate for the purposes authorized by 12 U.S.C. S29--and
consequently, does not have the effect of increasing banks'
real estate powers. Therefore, the real estate moratorium of
CEBA section 201(b)(6) could not apply here.
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Conclusion
In my opinion, your proposal does not give cause for objection
if implemented in accordance with the facts and conditions
described here.
Sincerely,
Jonathan Rushdoony
Senior Attorney
Legal Advisory Services Division
cc: William Glidden, Assistant Director, LASD
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FDIC
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Washington. DC 20429 Legal Division
May 22, 1987
Mr. Larry E. Hinman
President
Developers Capital Corporation
8 Old Baltimore Court
Olney, Maryland 20832
Dear Mr. Hinman
By letter of May 12, 1987, you requested the FDIC's opinion on whether
or not a particular program Developers Capital Corporation ("Developers")
intends to enter into with FDIC state chartered insured nonmember banks
complies with any applicable federal statutes and regulations. According
to your letter, Developers offers general real estate brokerage and
consulting services. Developers proposes to enter into arrangements
with state chartered insured nonmember banks whereby it will rent space
in bank branches which would be used to offer residential and commercial
real estate brokerage services to bank customers. The lease terms
may be calculated as a percentage of revenue generated from the brokerage
services during the previous month. The banks involved may promote
Developers' brokerage services by distributing literature to their
customers or by placing signs or posters in branch offices. Neither
the banks, their officers, nor their directors will have any equity
interest in Developers but the banks may from time to time utilize
Developers' services to liquidate portfolio properties or DPC property.
Please be advised that the FDIC's current regulations do not prohibit
an insured nonmember bank from leasing space in its branch offices
to a real estate brokerage firm. Whether or not a bank may do so is
therefore dependent upon state law. The FDIC would, of course, at
a minimum, evaluate such leasing arrangements for conformence with
safe and sound banking practices. Each situation would be evaluated
on the basis of the particular facts and in view of applicable laws
and regulations of the state in which the bank is located. Generally
speaking, the utilization of bank space, equipment and personnel in
connection with the operation of any business which is not an intergral
part of the bank would require reimbursement to the bank. Full details
regarding the lease arrangement should be disclosed to the bank's
shareholders and of course be approved by the bank's board of directors.
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What constitutes adequate compensation will vary from circumstance
to circumstance. The FDIC would be concerned that customers of the
brokerage agency that leases space in a bank's branch office are fully
apprised that they are dealing with a separate and completely independent
entity from the bank. More over, as the relationship is one which
is frought with possible conflicts of interest, the arrangement would
probably be the subject of careful review during an examination of
the bank.
We hope that the above is responsive to your request.
Sincerely,
V . .....
Pamela E.F. LeCren
Senior Attorney
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STATE OF MARYLAND
- D A SDepartment of Licensing and Regulation
WILLIAM DONALD SCHAEFERSTEBAKCMSSO RGovernorSTATE BANK COMMISSIONERGovernor
THE BROKERAGE - SUITE 800
WILLIAM A. FOGLE, JR. 34 MARKET PLACE
MerarGI H4 MULLER 301333626Secretary BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21202-4076
MARGIE H. MULLER 313366
Bank Commissioner
May 22, 1987
Mr. Larry E. Hinman, President
Developers Capital Corporation
8 Old Baltimore Court
Olney, Maryland 20832
Dear Mr. Hinman:
This is in response to your letter to me dated May 12, 1987. In your letter,
you request an opinion that your company,Developers Capital Corporation
("DCC"), may lease space in banks located in the State of Maryland. For
the reasons stated herein, and also upon the terms and restrictions stated
herein, it is my opinion that this activity is permissible under Maryland
law.
As I understand the facts, DCC is a general real estate brokerage firm. DCC
would lease space in branch offices of banks and offer residential and
commercial real estate brokerage services with the customers of the bank.
The rent paid would be a percentage of revenue generated from the services.
The banks may assist DCC by distributing literature to their client base or
by placings signs or posters in the branches. The banks, their officers,
directors,. or other affiliates will not have an equity interest in DCC. DCC
may be retained by a bank in regard to that bank's real estate held as a
result of foreclosures. These transactions constitute the full relationship
of DCC with the banks.
There are no specific provisions in Maryland law that concern the leasing
of space by a bank to a real estate brokerage concern. However, I may
approve activities for Maryland banks that are permissible for national
banking associations pursuant to Maryland Financial Institutions Article,
55-504(a). National banks have been permitted to lease space in their offices
and branches to both insurance agents and travel agencies under percentage
leases. See OCC Interpretative Letter No. 274, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
185,438; and OCC Interpretative Letter No. 342, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
185,512. See also Wirtz v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 365 F.2d 641,
(10th Cir. 1966) The rationale is that it is incidental to bank business
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Mr. Larry E. Hinman
May 22, 1987
Page 2
for a bank to own its premises and lease space therein. That rationale is
applicable here subject to the restrictions set out below.
National banks are permitted to lease space in bank buildings with certain
restrictions. These restrictions are that:
(1) The non-banking business should be appropriately and
separately identified from the banking business;
(2) The relationship between the bank and the leasing entity
should be arm's length and the bank must insure that
there are no tying arrangements;
(3) The bank should consider security problems if the tenant
requires after-banking hours entrance either by customers
or employees; and
(4) The bank should avoid leasing any space to employees,
directors, or officers of the bank or entities controlled
by such people.
Since these requirements have been imposed upon national banks, it is my
opinion that these restrictions are also applicable to state-chartered banks.
Consequently, it is my opinion that the activity as you propose is permissible
for state-cnartered banks subject to the above restrictions. If you have
any questions, please call Assistant Attorney General Frank C. Bonaventure, Jr.,
Chief of Financial Regulations and Advice, at (301) 333-4214.
Sincerely,
L/
Margie H. Muller
Bank Commissioner
MHM:pjp
cc: Frank C. Bonaventure
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